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Highway to controversy:
The Maine Turnpike and the way life should be
Maine Policy Review (1997). Volume 6, Number 2
by Charles S. Colgan
Whether to widen the turnpike has been a source of heated debate for many years and, despite
extensive study to clarify the issue, it remains polarized. Proponents argue that widening is
critical to the economic health of the state. Opponents argue that widening will not resolve
congestion problems over the long haul and advocate for alternatives such as peak-hour tolls. In
this forum, Charles Colgan traces the events leading up to the current impasse, covering the
arguments for and against widening and summarizing the extensive study of the issue. He
concludes that widening is necessary but irrelevant to the larger debate at hand, which will not be
resolved by a six-lane or four-lane turnpike.
You see the sign about a half-mile after you cross the Piscataqua River bridge from New
Hampshire into Maine. Just before the first exit in Maine, a blue sign announces "Welcome to
Maine: The Way Life Should Be." At that point the Maine Turnpike does not officially begin for
five and a half miles, yet as one looks north along the six-lane road toward Portland, Augusta,
and beyond, the sign's message is as much a challenge as a welcome. For the highway next to
that sign has become the center of a controversy - now nearly thirty years old - about what is "the
way life should be" in Maine.
A few miles beyond the sign, the Maine Turnpike officially begins and stretches 100 miles to
Augusta. It is the most heavily traveled road in Maine, particularly on the stretch between
Kittery and Portland. Twelve miles north of the sign, the road suddenly and unexpectedly
narrows to four lanes at an otherwise
undistinguished point. From that point to mile 42 in South Portland, where high-speed highway
travel divides between the turnpike heading west of the city to Lewiston and Auburn and 1-295
and 1-95 through Portland and Brunswick, the roadway is four lanes wide, largely unchanged
from when it originally was laid out in the early 1940s. That thirty miles has received more
attention than any comparable stretch of road in Maine, perhaps in New England, as several
attempts have been made to widen it to six lanes. All have been unsuccessful so far.
One might wonder why the turnpike has been the source of such heated debate over such a long
period of time. One also might wonder whether, amid all the heat, any light has been shed on the
turnpike and its role in Maine's economy and life.
This article seeks to answer these questions by reviewing the history of the Maine Turnpike
Authority's attempts to expand the roadway, the most recent detailed analysis of traffic on the
turnpike and alternatives for managing traffic congestion on the highway, and the major issues
being debated by proponents and opponents of widening. It concludes that both the proponents
and opponents of widening have used the turnpike as the symbolic center of a larger debate

between competing visions of Maine and in the process have misunderstood, mischaracterized,
and distorted the key issues about the highway itself. The result is likely to be a continuation of
the battle whatever the outcome of the 1997 referendum and a Maine that is the sum of the worst
fears of both sides in the debate.
FIFTY YEARS OF TRANSPORTATION, TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF DEBATE
The original impetus for the turnpike was traffic congestion, only in this case it was on Route 1.
In 1941 the Legislature, borrowing an idea from Pennsylvania, established the Maine Turnpike
Authority as an independent state agency to build and operate a four-lane, divided highway
between Kittery and Fort Kent. The Authority began selling the bonds that would finance the
turnpike and be repaid from tolls toward the end of World War II. Construction of the road
between Kittery and Portland got underway in 1944, and the turnpike opened to traffic on
December 13, 1947. The total cost was $20.6 million.
The road was an immediate success, and plans soon were set in motion to extend the road to
Lewiston-Auburn and Augusta, with a spur to Route 1 in Falmouth. This extension opened in
1955. Further development of what has become known as the Interstate Highway System would
carry the four-lane, high-speed highway concept to Bangor and on to Houlton, but without tolls,
which were forbidden by Congress on any highway funded from the interstate highway
program. In 1970, the Turnpike Authority directed its consulting engineers to develop a plan for
the first major improvements to the road. The engineers' top recommendation was that the
original road completed in 1947 be widened to six lanes. The Turnpike Authority began work on
the project at the southern end in 1971.
But this was a new era. The Legislature had enacted several major pieces of environmental
legislation that required much more detailed review of the impacts of a project than were
required when the turnpike was originally built. The Turnpike Authority took the position that as
a state agency, it was exempt from these reviews. The newly formed Department of
Environmental Protection sought an advisory opinion from the attorney general whether this was
so, and the attorney general concluded that the Turnpike Authority was not exempt.
Construction on the widening project continued while the case was litigated in the Maine courts
until 1974, when the Maine Supreme Judicial Court not only upheld the attorney general's
opinion that the Turnpike Authority was subject to state environmental laws, but also concluded
that the original grant of Authority to build the turnpike did not include authorization for a sixlane road.
The Turnpike Authority completed the widening then underway, halting at mile 12. By this
time, the energy crisis was driving up the cost of construction and slowing traffic growth.
Widening was put on hold through the next decade with its two energy crises and two major
recessions. As the economy began to recover in the wake of the 1981-82 recession, traffic
growth resumed and the Turnpike Authority began looking again at the widening issue. In 1984
it authorized new studies of future capital needs. The firm of Howard Needles Tammen &
Bergendoff (HNTB), which provides engineering services to the Turnpike Authority, reported in
September 1986.1 The HNTB analysis focused on traffic growth and the adequacy of future
turnpike revenues. It found that a combination of planned interchange additions plus growing
traffic on the southern part of the turnpike meant congestion would increase steadily and that the

widening project provided the best approach to dealing with traffic growth. The
recommendation included completing the widening project plus completing the groundwork
(acquisition plus grading) necessary to add a fourth lane in each direction at some time in the
future.
The HNTB study encouraged the Turnpike Authority to proceed with plans to widen the
turnpike. In 1987, the Legislature acted to provide the necessary legal and bonding Authority for
the widening project. But the analysis and forecasts on which the recommendation was based
appeared weak to a number of people who reviewed it. Lloyd Irland, a former state economist,
began to raise serious questions about the adequacy of the review of nonconstruction alternatives
that might be more effective in managing the peak-hour traffic congestion. Upon leaving state
government in late 1986, Irland began working with a newly formed public policy research
organization called the Mainewatch Institute to develop an alternative analysis to the HNTB
study.
That report,2 released in January 1988, questioned the widening on the grounds that traffic
congestion could be better managed using techniques such as peak-hour pricing, ramp metering,
and better information programs about traffic at a lower cost than widening. Mainewatch also
argued that the economic costs had not been justified by comparison with economic benefits, that
toll funding of the widening was inequitable, that environmental impacts had not been examined,
and that alternative uses for the toll revenues to build other projects had not been examined. It
concluded that a serious examination of alternatives to widening must be undertaken before the
project could proceed.
Even before the release of the Mainewatch report, the Turnpike Authority had initiated a second
look at the widening issues. The issues being raised by Mainewatch were receiving increased
attention in the press,3 and even Authority members were having doubts. One member, Peter
Danton, a former state senator from Saco, was concerned about the toll increase needed for the
project and expressed the fear that if tolls were raised there would be increased traffic on local
streets in Saco. In late 1987, the Authority decided to delay the first toll increase needed for the
widening, and engaged the firms of Roger Mallar Associates and Governmental Services Inc.
(M-GSI) to take another look at the widening project. Their report was released six months after
the Mainewatch report,4 and directly addressed many of the issues raised by Mainewatch.
However, it concluded that the alternatives to widening would not be sufficiently effective in
relieving traffic. Widening continued to be the recommended alternative, although the M-GSI
report recommended a somewhat scaled-back construction project that did not include adding the
groundwork for the fourth lane.
By 1989, the Turnpike Authority had completed two separate studies on widening that both
recommended proceeding with the project, and had received permission from the Legislature to
proceed. But opposition to the idea was growing. Environmental groups, led by the Natural
Resources Council of Maine (NRCM), were increasingly vocal on the need to investigate
alternatives to widening before proceeding. NRCM, Mainewatch, and others began to put
together a proposal to require such investigations before proceeding with the turnpike widening,

or any other major highway improvement. Dubbed the "Sensible Transportation Policy Act, a
signature-gathering campaign was undertaken in 1990, and the Legislature took up the bill in
1991 and passed it on for the voters to consider that November.
The prevailing wisdom was that the turnpike referendum had little chance of passing. The Maine
economy had descended into a severe recession, and concern about the economy was widespread. The idea that the public would reject a major project that the entire business community,
the governor, and majority of the Legislature declared as essential to the states economic future
was considered unlikely. But that is exactly what happened. There were several reasons why the
referendum passed. Voters in northern Maine overwhelmingly voted against the widening,
believing the project was just one more example of the advantages southern Maine gets and
fearful that their road needs would be neglected. Statewide, there was widespread distrust bordering on hostility - to state government and its leaders because of the severe budget cuts
forced by the recession.
Passage of the referendum enacted the Sensible Transportation Policy Act, which affected
virtually every major transportation improvement in the state. Because of the complexity of the
issues involved, the Department of Transportation undertook a nearly yearlong process in 1992
of developing and implementing regulations under the new act by bringing together many people
involved in transportation issues, including antagonists in the 1991 referendum debate. Once
this process was completed, the Turnpike Authority again turned to the question of what to do
about the road.
The Authority believed it was now legally obligated to undertake actual trials of as many of the
suggested alternative transportation strategies as possible. In 1993 and 1994, the Authority
initiated or expanded several projects designed to test whether the alternatives would be
sufficient to manage traffic. These included expanded park-and-ride lots, funding for a
commuter bus service from York County to Portland, a commitment to implement an electronic
toll collection system, and a decision to undertake a two-year experiment of congestion pricing.
The proposal to implement congestion pricing on an experimental basis became a new point of
controversy. The study approved by the Authority called for a five-week period in August 1995
when tolls would be raised during peak hours on weekends by two dollars per trip. At the same
time, tolls would be reduced during off-peak hours using a discount coupon system that would
permit toll reductions of seventy-five cents per trip (or free trips if the normal toll was less than
seventy-five cents). The proposal also would have imposed a one-dollar surcharge on commuter
pass holders if they traveled alone on Friday afternoon.5
The tourism industry mobilized against charting a higher toll on weekends, persuading the
governor and Legislature to permanently ban the idea of peak-hour tolls and to prohibit any toll
differentials on single-occupancy vehicles. The legislation also provided that the turnpike could
meet the requirements of the Sensible Transportation Policy Act through a modeling analysis
rather than by implementing any form of congestion pricing. The Turnpike Authority, however,
directed that the study be redesigned to test the effects of free tolls during off-peak hours during
1995 and again in 1996, and this redesigned study was undertaken.

In 1996, the Authority again turned to a comprehensive assessment of the turnpike. Rather than
relying solely on a consultant study this time, the Authority convened a Public Advisory
Committee (PAC) to investigate the options and make recommendations. The PAC was
comprised of representatives from the business and environmental communities, the Legislature,
the Regional Transportation Advisory Committees (RTACs) established by the Sensible
Transportation Policy Act, and communities from throughout Maine. With the assistance of a
consultant hired to review and analyze data for the committee, the PAC provided advice on the
scope of the new analysis and worked with the consultant hired to assist in the process. The
PAC also was charged with providing recommendations to the Authority how to proceed once
the evaluation of alternatives was completed.
In the fall of 1996, the PAC completed its recommendation to the Authority. A "preponderance"
of the committee concluded that the Turnpike Authority should proceed with both the widening
and further support of alternatives such as commuter buses and the reintroduction of passenger
rail service south of Portland. Some members of the PAC, notably environmental group
representatives, remained adamant that the case for widening had not been made and indicated
they would not support any recommendation that included the widening project.
The Legislature took up the issue again during the 1997 session, again acting to authorize the
widening project and the necessary bonding Authority. Faced with opponents' promises to
launch another petition drive for a referendum, the Turnpike Authority itself called for a
referendum to be held in the fall of 1997. At the same time, the Legislature also unanimously
rejected a bill that would have reinstated permission for the Authority to implement peak-hour
tolls when the tourism industry renewed its objections about the perceived negative image that
would be created.
CONDITIONS ON THE TURNPIKE IN 1997 AND BEYOND
The previous section provides a brief synopsis of the major events and elements in the turnpike
widening debate up to the present. It is apparent that even after a number of studies stretching
over more than a decade there remains fundamental disagreement about many of the facts, let
alone about what should be done with the turnpike. This section reviews trends in turnpike traffic
and points out why the issue of traffic on the turnpike has been, and continues to be, a matter of
concern.
Figure 1 shows the growth in traffic on the Maine Turnpike (including all exits from York to
Augusta).6 The figure depicts monthly traffic volumes from 1956 to 1996 (the period since the
full 100 miles of the turnpike was completed) and the annual growth rates to show trends. The
figure also places some of the major events from the history of the widening debate against the
actual growth in traffic.
Traffic growth clearly has occurred on the turnpike during the past forty years. Annual trips on
the turnpike have grown from 3.8 million to more than 44 million, an overall rate of more than
1,000 percent and an average annual growth rate of 6.4 percent, or about 1 million additional
vehicles on average each year. Since the first effort to widen the turnpike in 1973 total traffic has
grown by 256 percent, from 12 million to 44 million trips. Traffic on the turnpike varies

significantly by month, with July or August being the peak month and January or February the
slowest month. Another measure of traffic growth on the turnpike is that total January traffic in
1996 equaled traffic during the peak month of travel in 1984 (August), just twelve years earlier.
However, the rate of traffic growth has slowed somewhat. The average growth rate during the
1960s was 7.7 percent; this slowed to 6.9 percent in the 1970s but accelerated again in the 1980s
to an average of 8.5 percent. During the 1990s to date the average rate of growth has slowed to 3
percent. However, a slowing rate of growth does not signify fewer trips. The average growth in
trips during the 1990s at 3 percent is still more than 1 million additional trips per year, compared
with the 1960s average growth rate of 7.7 percent, which represented only 440,000 additional
trips per year.
Concern about traffic on the turnpike arises partly because of increased traffic that comes with
economic growth, but the primary issue is about peak-hour congestion during the highest-use
months of the summer. Two questions about peak hours require examination. The first concerns
summer traffic patterns; the second is how those patterns compare to the road's capacity.
Figure 2, figure 3, and figure 4 show the summer traffic patterns on Fridays, Saturdays, and
Sundays.7 The figures show the distribution of traffic across the twenty-four-hour period, using
the proportion of each day's traffic in each hour. The data is the average of each day during the
ten weeks from July through Labor Day in 1994, 1995, and 1996. (The turnpike's computer
system only began tracking hourly data in 1994.) There are clear and consistent trends each day.
On Fridays, there is a morning peak, followed by a slow down in traffic growth during the late
morning. A new and larger peak begins to form around noon and continues to build throughout
the afternoon, with the highest peak from 3 p.m. to 6 p.m. It is notable that the Friday peak
during the mid-to-late afternoon contradicts the conventional wisdom that the peak is driven by
inbound tourists who leave work in southern New England at the end of the workday. On
Saturdays and Sundays, there is no such peak. Rather, both days show a much broader "plateau"
of traffic spread over a six- to eight-hour period. On Saturdays, there is somewhat more traffic in
the morning, primarily southbound traffic reflecting the changeover in cottage and camp rentals
on Saturdays. The peak becomes somewhat more northbound in the afternoon. On Sundays, the
peak traffic is primarily southbound, beginning in the late morning and continuing throughout
the afternoon and into the early evening.
The composition of peak traffic changes over the three days of summer weekends. On Fridays,
the morning peak is composed primarily of commuters, but the afternoon peak is a mix of
commuter traffic plus inbound tourist traffic - there is very little commercial truck traffic during
this period. On Saturdays and Sundays, commuter traffic declines significantly as a portion of
total traffic (as measured by commuter pass use), and tourist-related traffic makes up almost all
of the peak on both days. This is particularly the case on Sundays.
The existence of distinct and consistent peak periods even extending over six to eight hours does
not by itself demonstrate that peak congestion is a problem. To find this out requires comparing
traffic loads with road capacity. Road capacity is not a single concept, however. Traffic
engineers use three concepts to describe capacity: the physical capacity; the level of service; and

the design hour. Physical capacity is determined by a number of factors, including width of the
lanes and shoulders, the geometry of the road, and terrain. In general, a road with wide lanes and
shoulders running in a straight line over level terrain will have a higher physical capacity than a
road with narrow lanes and shoulders, sharp curves, and hilly terrain.
The level-of-service concept describes a continuum of traffic conditions, from free-flowing
traffic at the posted speed limit to highly congested, stop-and-go traffic. In most discussions of
turnpike traffic, the relevant categories are LOS C through LOS F, defined as follows:
LOS C. Stable traffic flows, but small events can slow traffic. Average speeds are greater than
fifty-four mph. Noticeable restrictions on freedom to maneuver, with increased driver tension.
This is the level of service the Public Advisory Committee established as the target service the
turnpike should be able to offer; this is consistent with the practice of other roads similar to the
turnpike.
LOS D. Borderline between stable and unstable traffic flows; small increases in traffic cause
significant deterioration in speed and freedom to maneuver. Average speeds greater than fortysix mph.
LOS E. Operation at capacity, with restricted speeds and no room to maneuver. Vehicles
entering or changing lanes cause severe disruptions in traffic flow, which creates waves of slowdowns that propagate through the traffic stream. Average speeds about thirty mph.
LOS F. Forced or breakdown flow, with stop-and-go traffic. Entering traffic exceeds the number
of vehicles traversing any given point.
The design hour represents the target period for highway design. Highways are not designed to
accommodate the highest possible volume, since that would result in overbuilding. Rather, an
hour somewhat short of the highest possible traffic volume is chosen as the design hour.
Generally this is the thirtiest-highest hour in a year; that is, traffic volumes for each hour of a
year are estimated, and the volume during the thirtiest-highest hour is chosen as the level of
traffic for which the road should be designed.
Figure 5 and figure 6 bring these concepts together for the turnpike. They show the traffic
volumes for 1995 and forecasts for 2005 and 2015 in the design hour for each segment of the
turnpike from York to Exit 6A, where 1-95 and 1-295 diverge, and compare these traffic levels
with the traffic volumes that would produce LOS C and LOS D travel for northbound traffic on
Friday and southbound traffic on Sunday.8
Traffic levels for the design hour in 1995 showed traffic that flowed at LOS D in all segments
south of Exit 6A, in both northbound and southbound peaks. Forecast traffic for the design hour
shows that service will deteriorate to LOS E in the segments between Biddeford and South
Portland by 2005 and be very close to this level south of Biddeford. (Issues surrounding forecasts
of future traffic are discussed below.) By 2015, traffic will exceed capacity and deteriorate to
LOS F in all segments of the turnpike south of Exit 6A. However, once traffic divides at Exit 6A,

traffic conditions will remain at L0S C or better through 2005 and only reach LOS C between
2010 and 2015.
A final, much-discussed issue with respect to the unwidened section south of Portland is safety.
As traffic flow increase, the likelihood of accidents can increase as maneuver ability declines and
proximity between vehicles increases. Two measures of safety describe recent trends on the
turnpike. The first is the presence of High Accident Locations (HALs). These are road segments
or locations at which the number of accidents exceeds both a set threshold and a statistically
estimated level of expected accidents. There are ten HALs on the turnpike, all of which are in
the four-lane section south of Portland. Nine of the HALs are on the northbound lanes, and eight
are on segments between Biddeford and Scarborough (the most heavily traveled section of the
entire Turnpike).9
The twelve miles of the turnpike widened in the early 1970s provide a natural experiment to test
the effects of six lanes versus four lanes on accident rates. Figure 7 and figure 8 compare the
accident rate (accidents per hundred million vehicle miles) on the four-lane section with those on
the six-lane section south of Mile 12 for two three-year periods, 1987-89 and 1993-95.
Southbound, there is a decrease in the accident rate between the two periods, but the six-lane
section shows lower accident rates during both periods and a larger decline than on the four-lane
section. Northbound, which the number of HALs indicates is the more dangerous direction, there
is a slight increase in the accident rate between the periods, but again the six-lane section shows
significantly lower accident rates. When the records of individual accidents in the turnpike HALs
are grouped by major causes, 46 percent of accidents can be clearly attributed to road geometry
or congestion, the major problems in the four-lane section.10
The current conditions of the turnpike can be summarized as follows:
1. Traffic growth has been steady, except for brief periods during economic recessions. The total
traffic volume is more than ten times higher than when the road was originally designed in the
1940s. Traffic peaks during the summer months and particularly on weekends. The slowest
months in the 1990s equal the peak months of less than fifteen years ago. Together, these trends
constitute what might be described as the "base load" problem.
2. Peak traffic occurs on summer weekends, with peak traffic spread over very long periods of up
to seven hours. Current traffic levels in a design hour show a low level of service. Projected
growth rates show that capacity will be reached in many segments by 2005 and in all segments
between 2005 and 2015. This is the "peak load" problem.
3. Accident data indicates the four-lane road is noticeably more prone to accidents than the sixlane stretch.

THE DEBATE OVER THE FUTURE OF THE TURNPIKE
The debate over the turnpike now turns on a variety of arguments for and against widening and
for and against the alternatives to widening. This section examines a number of the major
arguments for and against widening. It also looks at the arguments for and against what is
perhaps the most important alternative to widening: congestion pricing. One set of issues that
will not be examined are the environmental impacts. Those important issues must await another
analysis.
IN FAVOR OF WIDENING
The project is economically justified
A threshold test for any public investment of this type is whether it meets basic tests of economic
efficiency. This is measured by benefit-cost analysis, which compares the increased capital and
operating costs of the project plus the increases in vehicle operating costs (which rise with
increased speeds) to the benefits of time saved from reduced congestion, accidents, and diversion
to less-efficient alternate routes. Figure 9 shows the results of the benefit-cost analysis conducted
for the Public Advisory Committee. The benefit-cost analysis shows that benefits will exceed
costs by more than $107 million in present value over twenty- five years at a 6 percent discount
rate.11 The benefit-cost ratio is 1:6, showing that the widening project passes the basic test of an
acceptable investment.
Two criticisms can be leveled at this analysis, however. One is not valid, the other is valid. The
invalid criticism is that the benefit-cost analysis should include the costs of increasing congestion
on other roads from the increased traffic that would result from widening. In fact, there may be
such costs, but they are properly considered in the benefit-cost analysis applied to projects to
manage traffic on the other roads, not the turnpike. As pointed out below, the turnpike does need
to be considered as part of broader transportation links. But there are a huge number of potential
projects that could be undertaken to manage traffic throughout Maine (since the turnpike carries
traffic from throughout Maine, virtually every road in the state potentially is subject to its
influence). To try to include the benefits and costs of every potential traffic management project
in order to determine the net effect across the whole system would be an impossible and,
ultimately, meaningless task.
The valid criticism concerns the environmental costs and mitigation strategies that will be
required to meet them. Two major environmental costs would be incurred from widening the
turnpike. One is increased air pollution. However, since southern Maine is already a moderate
nonattainment area under the Clean Air Act, the turnpike widening will have to be shown to have
no net increase in air pollution to secure the necessary permits from the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA). There will be costs to any strategies undertaken to meet this condition,
and they should be included on the cost side of the benefit-cost ledger. The other environmental
cost is the loss of some twenty-three acres of wetlands. This loss has an economic value,
although estimating that value is very difficult.12 Again, there will be mitigation strategies
required whose costs must be included. The net environmental costs cannot, however, be
estimated with any confidence until it is clear what actions will be required by state and federal
agencies to deal with the costs. For this reason, the benefit-cost analysis should be redone after it

becomes clear what will be required to comply with environmental standards to ensure the
environmental costs do not exceed the $107 million in net present value benefits currently
estimated to exist.
The turnpike is the major road in and out of Maine and thus is essential to the economy.
In order to assess the economic impact of the turnpike, an analysis was done for the Public
Advisory Committee comparing future growth in the Maine economy if the turnpike is widened
and if it is not. The analysis was done using the econometric models of Maine developed by
Regional Economic Models Inc. (REMI), one of the most widely used regional economic
models.13 The base forecast of the REMI model assumes growth will not be constrained by
major restrictions on key infrastructure like the turnpike. In order to assess the impacts of
widening, an alternate forecast was prepared that modeled what would happen if the turnpike
was not widened. The analysis uses a scenario of an unwidened turnpike because the model uses
an assumption of growth unconstrained by infrastructure capacity. Thus, compared with a
baseline unconstrained forecast, an unwidened turnpike would be characterized by reduced
efficiency and higher costs in the trucking industry and reduced tourism expenditures from
travelers who avoid coming to Maine because of the congestion.
The analysis for the PAC shows that a turnpike that reached its capacity between 2005 and 2015
would be accompanied by a reduction of 11,000 jobs in Maine (6,000 in York and Cumberland
counties), resulting in a decline of $211.6 million in real disposable personal income and $456
million in gross state product. These figures may be about 25 percent high because of the
inclusion of lost hotel expenditures in the tourist-industry effects (those coming for extended
stays are less likely to be dissuaded by congestion than those coming on day trips), but it is clear
the turnpike plays a significant role in determining the overall prospects for the Maine economy.
Alternatives have not proved to be sufficient to reduce congestion.
Under the Sensible Transportation Policy Act, the Turnpike Authority has undertaken
implementing a number of the alternatives. These experiments have shown that design-hour
traffic in 2005 could be reduced by the amounts shown in Table 1.14
Table 1: Reduction in Design Hour Traffic
(number of vehicles)
Low

High

Commuter Bus Service
Commuter Rail Service
Intercity Rail Service
Freight diversion
Congestion pricing15

5
7
21
20
68

89
122
39
20
81

TOTAL

121

351

These reductions compare with 1995 traffic levels that average 2,400 vehicles in the design-hour
northbound (Fridays) and 2,600 southbound (Sundays), and estimated 2005 levels of 3,200
northbound and 3,400 southbound on the same days.
OPPOSED TO WIDENING
Traffic forecasts are too high; the problem is not as serious as it is made out to be
Both actual and forecast traffic growth rates on the turnpike have declined significantly since the
mid-1980s when the HNTB report first recommended widening. The HNTB forecast a rate of
traffic growth of nearly 9 percent per year. The subsequent Mallar-Governmental Services Inc.
report lowered the projected traffic growth rate to 6 percent, which at the time was lower than
what was actually being experienced on the turnpike but in line with long-term growth trends
over the previous thirty years.
Neither the HNTB nor Mallar-GSI reports developed statistically based estimates derived from a
forecast of the Maine economy. For the 1996 PAC process, VHB prepared a forecast of traffic
growth based on the University of Southern Maine Center for Business and Economic Research
long-term economic forecasts. These forecasts were prepared by the author for Economic
Development Districts in Maine and for each of the Regional Transportation Advisory
Committee regions established under the Sensible Transportation Policy Act in order to provide
a consistent forecast for transportation planning across all areas of the state. The resulting
forecast produced a growth rate in turnpike traffic of 2.93 percent, which was reduced further for
the estimation of future trends to 2.75 percent. This is the growth rate underlying the projections
of future capacity constraints as well as the benefit-cost and economic impact analyses.
But, it is argued, these figures are still too high. They forecast growth in total annual traffic (base
load rather than peak load, which grows more slowly). There are two responses to this argument.
The first, illustrated in Figure 10, is to assume the growth rate of the peak is only half that of the
base (1.37 percent versus 2.75 percent). Under the 2.75 percent assumption, traffic reaches LOS
E in about four years and LOS F in another four years. Cutting the rate of growth in half extends
the period it takes to get to LOS F to around 2013, but leaves the turnpike at LOS E from 2006
until then. Costs, in the form of traffic delays, will continue to grow each year. Since it will take
about eight years of permitting and construction to complete the widening (meaning it would not
be completed until 2006), delaying the widening does not solve the congestion problem, it only
extends the time period at which summer traffic endures LOS E (speeds under thirty mph with
frequent delays) before it becomes completely stop-and-go (LOS F).
In a real sense, however, this argument about peak growth rates misses the point. Traffic growth
on the turnpike has slowed from historic levels of around 6 percent to around 4 percent because
of the congestion problem.16 In other words, the argument that traffic growth is slowing is a
measure of the problem, not the solution. Carried to its logical extreme, the "high growth rate"
argument implies that if the turnpike was at full capacity with stop-and-go travel year-round and
thus experiencing a zero growth rate, it should not be widened at all.

Much was made in the debate leading up to the 1991 referendum focused on the argument that
traffic congestion only occurs on the turnpike for ten days a year and for a total of perhaps sixty
hours. If the problem is this small, why spend all that money to fix it? It has become clear,
however, that the congestion problem is significantly more widespread. The 1995-96 congestionpricing study found consistent levels of peak-hour traffic congestion over ten weekends plus
holidays (thirty-four days, including Labor Day and the Fourth of July), Congestion is also a
problem on Memorial Day and Columbus Day weekends, with periodic problems on other
weekends in June and September depending on weather. This increases the time when
congestion is currently a problem to more than forty days per year.
Using the projected growth rates discussed above, VHB estimates that the number of hours
below the target Level of Service C will be as shown in Table 2.17
Table 2: Hours Worse than LOS C
SOUTHBOUND
2005
2015

NORTHBOUND
2005
2015

LOS D
LOS E
LOS F

520
200
111

435
227
175

747
413
557

550
247
686

TOTAL

831

837

1,717

1,483

Traffic Congestion is a natural phenomenon. People choose to drive during congested
periods, so why fix it?
The Mainewatch study points out that "virtually all of those inconvenienced by congestion are
aware of the congestion periods in advance, yet voluntarily choose to become ensnarled in
them." Thus, if people choose to drive when the road is congested, that is their problem, not one
that requires major construction to solve.
The response to this argument is usually that people do not always have the option of when they
drive, as is the case with commuters. This is partly true, but insufficient. There is some evidence
of ability to shift time of travel, as indicated by the shifting of the peak on Friday afternoons to
earlier periods. The real problem with this argument is that it ignores fundamental conditions of
economic efficiency. To see this, imagine that the Maine Turnpike was owned by a private
company. Such a company would have an effective monopoly over high-speed highway travel in
the corridor, and as such would act (in the absence of government regulation) to maximize its
profit by overpricing and under producing its services. That is, the turnpike would have high tolls
and there would be no incentive to spend money to improve service on the road. Why bother
spending money to relieve congestion when consumers had no choice but to drive on the road?
This situation clearly would not be tolerated for very long if the turnpike was, in fact, a private
monopoly. That is the reason it is owned by a public Authority, which manages the turnpike
under a public service obligation. Rather than the profit-maximizing rule of the monopolist that
leads to poor service, the service obligation of a public Authority means economic investments

that will improve services should be undertaken. As long as economically justified investments
are not undertaken, there is a significant loss in economic welfare (measured by the benefits
discussed above). In other words, though people may choose to drive on a congested highway,
there is still an economic loss from congestion that should be addressed. Forcing the Turnpike
Authority to behave like a monopolist will not result in an economic improvement.
Alternatives to widening have not been explored sufficiently.
Of the alternatives to widening that have been examined, the one that has been examined least
and that has the most potential for managing traffic is congestion pricing. The reason is that the
Legislature prohibited the Turnpike Authority from raising tolls during peak hours before the
experiment could be conducted in 1995. What has been tested is off-peak discounted tolls, which
allowed coupon holders (1995) and frequent turnpike travelers (1996) to travel free during the
periods before and after the peaks on summer weekends. These experiments showed that this
was insufficient incentive to alleviate congestion.18
Would congestion pricing involving peak-hour tolls be more successful as a traffic management
device? There is no doubt that peak-hour surcharges on tolls would be more effective in reducing
peak-hour traffic than off-peak discounts or even free travel would be by itself. But the final
report of the congestion-pricing study concluded that even peak-hour tolls would not likely be an
effective management device given the current turnpike configuration. With no real alternate
routes, congestion pricing can only provide incentives to shift the time of travel. With peak-hour
periods already extending over six to seven hours, the available time into which travel could be
shifted even with peak tolls is limited. Moreover, analysis of the responses to the discount tolls
showed that travelers were much more likely to shift the time of their travel on Sundays than on
Fridays. Peak tolls would alleviate some of the congestion on Sundays and perhaps on Saturdays,
but Fridays would remain a very difficult problem. These problems will only increase as baseload traffic growth continues.
Beyond this, the fact remains that peak-hour tolls are illegal under current law, a fact reaffirmed
by the Legislature in 1997 when it unanimously refused to lift the ban on peak-hour tolls. As
argued below, peak-hour tolls can be, and should be, an essential part of effective traffic
management on the turnpike. But until the Legislature can be convinced of this, peak tolls are not
on the menu.
The other alternative that might have an impact is passenger rail, which still has not been
implemented and may yet be some years away. Passenger rail may play a large role in
transportation within the southern Maine corridor, but its competitiveness against auto traffic
remains doubtful. Current plans for a low-speed rail line would provide for a Portland-Boston
trip of one and a half to two hours, which is only a slight improvement over the auto travel time.
Passenger rail is also designed to capture trips that currently are unaccommodated for by auto
travel, and thus would not necessarily draw traffic off the turnpike.

The turnpike should not be widened because it will make traffic worse on already crowded
secondary roads.
The implication of this argument is that the solution to highway problems in Maine is to limit the
volume of vehicles in the state to that which can be carried on a four-lane turnpike. However,
increasing congestion on the turnpike does not solve the problem of secondary road traffic, since
congested traffic still ultimately will be released onto secondary roads. It is certainly the case that
additional work will be required to improve service on highways throughout the state, but
arguing that the turnpike's problems should not be addressed until all the other roads are
addressed is a classic example of "making the best the enemy of the better." Fortunately, the
Sensible Transportation Policy Act envisioned a process that assured major transportation
investments would be considered in the context of regional transportation needs. The
implementing regulations established eight regional Transportation Advisory Committees to
work with the Department of Transportation in order to assure that coordination between state
and local plans takes place.
Money to pay for widening should be used on other road projects.
With more than 8,000 miles of highway, and real needs for improvements to highways and
bridges throughout the state, it is certainly tempting to look to turnpike tolls in order to pay for
these improvements rather than raising gas taxes. There is little doubt that the defeat of the
widening in the 1991 referendum was tied in part to the view that turnpike money should be
spent elsewhere. But there are legal and economic difficulties with such an approach.
It may be noted that in 1995 the Legislature authorized the Department of Transportation to
borrow the next ten years of funds that were to be received from the turnpike to fund the
completion of three bridge projects (the Casco Bay bridge, the Brunswick-Topsham bypass, and
the third Waterville-Winslow bridge) when Highway Fund revenues from the gas tax proved
inadequate. This would appear to be a precedent for diversion of future funds to other nonturnpike projects. However, this is very unlikely. The diversion of revenues to the bridge projects
incorporated funds that already were being used by the Department of Transportation. New bond
issues to be backed by toll revenues would run headlong into the bond covenant problem. They
either would be restricted to use on the turnpike or the bonds would have to be charged as
general obligation bonds.
Moreover, there is good reason to doubt that any large-scale transfer of revenues from the
turnpike to other highway projects is justified. First, turnpike toll revenues are legally dedicated
to the construction and maintenance of the turnpike. When the turnpike legislation was written in
1941, the road was established as a toll road with a separate Authority established to build and
maintain the road. By establishing a separate legal entity with its own funding source, tolls, the
state could build the road without any legal obligations to the Highway Fund or General Fund.
The Turnpike Authority borrowed money using bonds backed by the pledge that toll revenues
would be used to repay the bonds and maintain the highway. The Turnpike Authority does
provide a fixed amount of its revenue to the Department of Transportation each year for projects
related to other transportation improvements in the turnpike corridor,19 but as long as the
Turnpike Authority has outstanding revenue bonds that contain this pledge, it will not be
possible to divert significant funds to other projects.

There is also good reason to doubt that even a larger diversion of turnpike revenues to other
highway projects would not be good policy. It is certainly not clear that equity would be served
by having turnpike travelers have the tolls they pay diverted to projects in northern Maine while
they continue to sit in traffic on an increasingly congested highway. Indeed, it would be hard to
justify the diversion of turnpike tolls to other projects on equity grounds under any
circumstances.
Moreover, it is not clear that even if the turnpike revenues could be diverted to other highway
projects that widening would necessarily take second place to any other project. In any ranking
of projects on benefit-cost grounds, the important variables driving the outcomes would be the
number of travelers affected and the value of transportation-time improvements. If projects were
analyzed and rank ordered on a net benefits basis, the turnpike widening would certainly rank
very high, if not at the top of the list simply because of the volume of traffic affected by the
project. There might be projects elsewhere with critical safety needs, but the only justification for
using turnpike revenues for such a project, rather than drawing on other projects from the
Highway Fund or raising the gasoline tax, would be to avoid potential political difficulties.
Another side of this argument is the question of whether or not the original vision of the turnpike
as a road extending all the way to Fort Kent should be completed. The turnpike legislation was
enacted more than a decade before the federal government undertook responsibility for building
the interstate highway system, which eventually led to the extension of a limited-access highway
from Augusta to Houlton. The idea of extending the limited-access highway north from Houlton
to Madawaska or from Bangor to Calais continues to be much discussed, but the problem
remains how to pay for it. Neither state nor federal road-building budgets could currently support
it, and there is no evidence that traffic volumes would be high enough to pay for the road through
tolls. Constraints on the expansion of a limited-access highway in northern Maine are not to be
found in the resolution of the question of widening thirty miles in York and Cumberland
counties.
We are already subsidizing congestion with the commuter pass system.
The commuter pass allows those who frequently travel on the turnpike to purchase the right to
unlimited travel between any two exits during a three-month period for a flat fee. By law; the fee
must be priced at 50 percent of the regular toll for two daily trips on weekdays during the threemonth period. It may be argued that this is a form of congestion pricing in that it provides
additional incentive to drive during peak hours on weekdays. There is undoubtedly some truth in
this, although the reality of congestion on the turnpike is more complex. The peak hours that
approach capacity are on summer weekends when, as indicated above, only on Fridays are
commuters a significant portion of traffic volumes. Commuters account for only 5 to 10 percent
of summer weekend traffic.
Moreover, it is not commuter traffic per se that is the major problem with congestion. As a
number of studies have shown, it is single-occupancy vehicles (SOVs) that create the greatest
problems during rush hours.20 It was for this reason the congestion-pricing study proposed a
cash surcharge on Friday afternoons on commuter pass holders in SOVs in an effort to provide
an incentive not to change time of travel, which is very difficult with commuters, but to change
the mode. However, this surcharge was outlawed along with all other peak-hour pricing. The

problem of SOV commuters is one the Turnpike Authority will need to address, but the problems
of summer weekend congestion that are driving traffic toward capacity on the current roadway
would not be solved by addressing this issue alone.
The widening will only solve the congestion problem temporarily; congestion will reur and
then we will have to add a forth lane, etc.
The projections of traffic growth at 2.75 percent show the need for widening as early as 2005 if
LOS E or worse levels of congestion are to be avoided. These projections indicate that widening
will result in achieving the target level of service LOS C between 2005 and 2015, but by 2015
continued growth in traffic at 2.75 percent will return traffic levels even on the widened roadway
to the current LOS D. However, the widened road almost certainly will result in a faster rate of
growth than the 2.75 percent, causing peak congestion reform within less than a decade.
This phenomenon of new or improved roads experiencing renewed congestion soon after the
improvement project is finished is explained by what is known as the Downs triple
convergence,21 which is named for the economist who described it. When a road is built or
improved to alleviate congestion, traffic does not simply grow at previous rates, but at faster
rates because traffic is diverted onto the new road from three sources: those who had traveled at
later or earlier times to avoid congestion those who had diverted to alternate routes to avoid
congestion and those who had switched to public transportation. Of these the latter would have
little effect on the turnpike, but the former two sources clearly would be a source of additional
traffic. The traffic data clearly shows diversion in time, as evidenced by the very wide peaks of
summer weekend traffic.
Downs points out that the only approach that avoids the triple convergence and the continuation
of congestion is to apply congestion pricing. However, it already has been pointed out that
congestion pricing under current law is not very effective and that effective congestion pricing is
not legal. In addition, the already wide peaks and low responsiveness to price on some days
make congestion pricing alone an inadequate response to current and projected congestion levels.
If the roadway were to be widened, congestion would be temporarily relieved. People who have
shifted their time of travel (which does occur on all three days) in order to avoid congestion will
revert to their preferred time of travel, causing peaks to reform. It is at this point that peak tolls
could spread the peaks over a longer time period (and a wider road).
The analysis thus indicates that widening the turnpike is a necessary but not sufficient response
to the congestion problem. Congestion pricing has potential to alleviate future congestion on a
widened road but not current levels. Only the combination of the two might provide a more
stable long-term solution to traffic congestion on the turnpike. If this is the case, however, Maine
finds itself in the curious position in which both of the necessary components of a solution to the
turnpike traffic problem have been adamantly and successfully opposed by one group or another
and effectively outlawed. Therefore, in order to complete this assessment, it is necessary to
examine the arguments about peak-hour pricing. This can be done most easily by considering the
arguments against peak-hour pricing.

Peak tolls won't work and will destroy the tourist industry.
The 1988 Mallar-Govemmental Services Inc. study rejected peak-hour tolls as unlikely to be
effective, and this has been a common view. The argument is that the turnpike traffic is
predominantly made up of people who have little flexibility in their time of travel or would be
insensitive to a peak toll in the overall context of what is spent on vacation.22 At the same time,
there was immense concern in the tourist industry that any peak-hour toll would be seen by
tourists as an insult and would simply drive people away from Maine. These twin impulses
clearly are contradictory; peak-hour tolls cannot be simultaneously so small as to be ineffective
and so large as to discourage tourists from coming. Yet these are the arguments that were made,
as the following excerpt from the legislative debate on the bill outlawing peak tolls indicates:
"People come to Wells and to southern Maine. They pay $500 to $1,000 to rent a place for the
week. They aren't going to change their plans when they arrive because of a $2 charge by the
Maine Turnpike at certain times of the day. If they do know about it and if they wish to avoid the
$2 surcharge, guess where they will go? They go up Route 1. I can tell you that Route 1 does not
need that traffic. If people know about the $2 surcharge they may not come at all, but if they do
not know about the surcharge and they come up to the toll booth, they are hit right in the face
with a charge that seems to them truly exorbitant."23
Despite the self-contradiction in these arguments, the congestion-pricing study collected
evidence on both. With respect to the question of whether people would respond to the monetary
incentives at all, the off-peak free travel offered during 1995 and 1996 was accompanied by
statistically significant increases in the off-peak-hour traffic on Sundays and, to a limited extent,
on Saturdays. The experience on Fridays was much more mixed, with some evidence in the 1995
study of effects in the morning but no evidence of shifting traffic toward the off-peak hours in
the afternoon in either year. At the same time, what shifts there were toward off-peak hours were
not sufficient to reduce peak traffic volumes, largely because of the volume of traffic and length
of the peak period.
Thus, the argument that people will not change their time of travel to respond to price incentives
is not accurate as a generalization. People do respond to price incentives on the Maine Turnpike,
just as they do when they choose to make long-distance calls in the evening or attend a low-price
matinee movie. But it is also the case that the results from the congestion-pricing experiment are
consistent with the observation that the flexibility to change times is an important factor, at least
on weekdays.
When the Maine Legislature outlawed peak-hour tolls in June, 1995, the proposal before it was
to raise tolls by $2 on Friday and Sunday peak hours over a total of thirty-three hours on eleven
days. The peak tolls were to be accompanied by more than 300 hours of off-peak discount tolls.
Yet this rather modest effort to test peak tolls provoked outrage in the tourism industry. The bill
that the Legislature passed not only forbade peak-toll experiments, it forbade peak tolls
permanently and stated that congestion pricing would not have to be actually tried in order to
fulfill the requirements of the Sensible Transportation Policy Act. It has been the case that
congestion pricing has not been politically popular anywhere it has been proposed. Despite

federal funding to experiment with congestion pricing as part of the Intermodal Surface
Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA), peak-hour tolls have been imposed on no public road in
the United States.24
Testing whether the public's response to the idea of peak-hour tolls would be as negative as was
suggested was part of a survey conducted of turnpike travelers on the fourth weekend of August
1995. This was a survey handed out to travelers at toll plazas selected to capture the majority of
the incoming and outgoing tourist traffic. Two questions were asked concerning congestion
pricing. The first posited that discounted tolls might be continued in the future and asked about
the preferred method for raising revenue to offset the losses that would occur. Peak-hour tolls
were selected by a plurality of respondents from among five choices. Peak-hour tolls were
preferred more by residents of Massachusetts and New Hampshire than those from Maine.
The second question presented a set of hypothetical peak-hour surcharges from fifty cents to
three dollars and asked whether such surcharges would encourage the traveler to shift the time of
travel, the route of travel, discourage them from making the trip, or would have no effect. Figure
11 shows the answers to this question. The responses are very much in line with what would be
expected; as the peak surcharge increases, there is less willingness to continue the trip as before
and greater willingness to switch either route or time. However, at suggested peak surcharges up
to three dollars, there is no significant expressed willingness to discontinue the trip altogether.
Survey research of this type is not necessarily a reliable guide to actual behavior (remember
"new Coke"), but the idea of peak tolls was received with much less hostility and much more
understanding than would have been suspected given the swiftness and finality with which the
Legislature acted to dispose of the idea.
Peak tolls are inadequate.
Another common argument against peak tolls in Maine and elsewhere is that they are inequitable
because they force people who cannot change the time of their travel or their route. There is also
a sense that the road is already being paid for (through tolls or fuel taxes), so why should one
have to pay extra? It is the case that if alternatives are available, they generally are used, at least
up to the point at which principal routes and alternates are both congested. So in many situations,
congestion pricing does try to encourage people to use alternatives that often are not there.
Economists who have developed the theory of congestion pricing have pointed out that when a
road becomes crowded, each additional vehicle creates congestion delays not only for itself but
for all the vehicles around it. Since space is at premium in such situations, it should command a
higher price. Thus, there is no inherent inequity in asking people to pay additional amounts when
space is at a premium and each additional vehicle diminishes the space available for everyone.25
Still, it is clear that the perceived inequity outweighs the theoretical equity and plays a role in
preventing congestion pricing from being implemented.
For this reason, it has been argued that the key to making congestion pricing work is to provide a
clear-cut benefit in exchange for the peak-hour toll, and that this benefit must go beyond the
reduced congestion that would result.26 This was confirmed by the Maine Turnpike survey
results cited earlier; peak-hour surcharges were the most frequently chosen option because the

question asked about the benefit of discount tolls rather than simply asking, "Should we use
higher tolls to control congestion?" The idea that peak tolls must be tied to clear benefits to gain
public support means that the only way congestion pricing might be implemented on the Maine
Turnpike is in conjunction with widening.
If peak tolls were used to pay for at least a substantial portion of the widening costs, equity
actually would be enhanced, since those who would get the most benefit from the widening
would pay the greater share of the costs. Those who would get less benefit, such as travelers in
the winter months or during the overnight hours, would not have to pay for a benefit (less
congestion) they were not receiving.27
CONCLUSIONS: THE ROAD AHEAD
The proposal to widen the turnpike in the late 1980s may have been justified on economic
grounds at the time. But the evidence to support it was weak, and the 1991 referendum and
passage of the Sensible Transportation Policy Act requiring a thorough evaluation of alternatives
prior to a decision have clearly improved our understanding of the turnpike, transportation
options, the consequences of the choices available to Maine, and thus the confidence with which
decisions can be made. The conclusions the evidence supports are the following:
1. The Turnpike Authority should proceed with plans to widen the four-lane stretch of the
Turnpike from mile 12 to mile 42 (Exit 6A) to six lanes. This means moving to the next
stage of seeking the required permits from state and federal agencies - at this time
environmental-impact issues, including wetland losses, and air-quality impacts will have
to be addressed. If these can be satisfactorily addressed, the project should proceed.
2. The Legislature should authorize the Turnpike Authority to use peak-hour tolls. The
Authority should develop a plan to integrate peak tolls and off-peak discounts to pay for
the widening and manage traffic on the improved road. (Other alternatives for passenger
transportation in the southern corridor also should be pursued, including passenger rail to
Boston and efforts to reduce single-occupancy vehicles on the Turnpike and other roads.)
Only this combination of actions will address both the base- and peak-load problems now and in
the future. Yet this has been specifically rejected by both sides in the turnpike debate.
Environmental groups have been adamant that widening is not needed and that congestion
pricing will solve the problem (perhaps in combination with rail service). Business groups
supporting a wider turnpike, particularly the trucking and tourist industries, have been just as
adamant that peak tolls not be used. Despite the evidence presented about public reaction to the
idea of peak tolls on the turnpike, tourist representatives turned out in force to oppose a bill
during the 1997 legislative session that would have granted the Turnpike Authority permission to
use peak tolls.28 The trucking industry joined them in opposition, despite the fact that most
truckers do not drive during peak hours on summer weekends but would have to pay higher tolls
year-round if peak tolls are not used.
So after several years of studies and actual implementation of alternatives to widening totaling
tens of millions of dollars, it does not appear the debate has progressed any distance at all from
1991, or 1988, or 1974, for that matter. It is probably impossible to understand all the reasons the
turnpike should continue to be such a flashpoint of controversy, but it does seem that more is in

play here than the simple question of whether thirty miles of a road ought to be six lanes or four.
The turnpike-widening debate has been less about technical questions of load forecasts or the
finer points of demand theory, but about a clash of values about the way life should be in Maine.
On one side are the opponents of widening, who see it as part of an inevitable deterioration of
Maine's quality of life, caused largely by the automobile. Increasing auto traffic brings with it
deteriorating air quality, more traffic on local roads, more suburban sprawl, and a loss of the
open space and wildlife habitat many see as the most valuable part of Maine. Widening the
turnpike will simply allow more of this destructive process to occur.
On the other side are the proponents of widening, who see economic growth as essential to the
quality of life and who see government's responsibility to provide the infrastructure to make that
possible. Widening is essential to this process, and any attempt to impose the costs of that project
on those most directly affected would be a signal that Maine's public is unfriendly to growth.
Because it is a clash of values rather than a clash over the facts, the fight over the turnpike is
likely to continue, whatever the outcome of the referendum in the fall of 1997. If approval for
widening is given, opponents can be expected to continue to wage the battle before regulatory
agencies and in the courts during the permitting process. If approval is refused, traffic growth
will continue on the turnpike and will eventually force another effort to deal with the problem.
Until a better way is found to deal with this clash of values and implement the traffic strategies
ten years of studies indicate would work, the only certainty is that congestion on the turnpike
will continue and transform the highway into the something resembling the Southeast
Expressway through downtown Boston at rush hour precisely what most widening opponents
fear Maine will look like with a wider turnpike. And the Maine economy will be noticeably
smaller than it would be otherwise. The turnpike will have become the road along which Maine
loses, whichever direction you travel.
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